VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Zaire Paige ("Paige") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of his federal constitutional rights in connection with incidents of assaults against him committed by other inmates while Paige was in custody at a facility of the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC"). He also alleges ongoing verbal harassment by a DOC officer. Paige named as defendants the City of New York (the "City"), DOC, and CO. Cobham ("Cobham") (collectively, the "City Defendants").
Paige was served with the City Defendants' motion on May 2, 2011, including the Notice to pro se litigants pursuant to Local Rule 56.2. Paige failed to respond to the motion by the June 6, 2011 deadline specified in the Notice of Motion. Accordingly, the Court deems the motion unopposed and the factual statements made by the City Defendants in the motion papers are deemed admitted. See Gadsden v. Jones Lang Lasalle Ams., Inc., 210 F.Supp.2d 430, 438 (S.D.N.Y.2002); see also Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir.1984).
In reviewing the City Defendants' motion papers and other documents on the public record of this action, including Paige's complaint, the Court has considered Paige's pro se status and reads his allegations and claims with the leniency due. See McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999). Paige's pro se status, however, does not excuse him from complying with applicable procedural and substantive law, including responding to a dispositive motion. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983). Mindful of these considerations, the Court grants the City Defendants' motion.
The action against DOC cannot proceed because under the New York City Charter DOC is not an entity that is subject to suit. See N.Y. City Charter, Chapter 17, § 396. As to Paige's claims against the City, the Court is persuaded that Paige failed to identify the existence of any policy or practice that would establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Serices., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), as to the circumstances presented by this action.
Paige's claims against Cobham must be dismissed because the allegations Paige makes in his complaint and in his deposition fail to establish any personal involvement by Cobham in any of the injuries that form the grounds for Paige's claims. Cobham's only alleged involvement in the incident in question is having been on duty near the scene of an altercation between Cobham and Hernandez. In any event, the Court finds that Cobham would be entitled to the protection against suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 633-34 (2d Cir.2000).
Finally, on the record before it, the Court finds no facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of a claim of conspiracy against the City Defendants. Paige's allegations of conspiracy are too vague and conclusory and provide no factual basis to support a finding that he suffered a constitutional deprivation on this account. Moreover, the conspiracy Paige alleges involves only City Defendants who, as agents of the same municipal entity, cannot conspire among themselves. See Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motion and to close this case.